One Time Too Many: In re Briones and the BIA\u27s Rigid Interpretation of the LIFE Act and its Dire Consequences for Undocumented Reentry by Gonzalez, Lauren
San Diego International Law Journal 
Volume 12 
Issue 2 Spring 2012 Article 9 
3-1-2011 
One Time Too Many: In re Briones and the BIA's Rigid 
Interpretation of the LIFE Act and its Dire Consequences for 
Undocumented Reentry 
Lauren Gonzalez 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/ilj 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lauren Gonzalez, One Time Too Many: In re Briones and the BIA's Rigid Interpretation of the LIFE Act and 
its Dire Consequences for Undocumented Reentry, 12 San Diego Int'l L.J. 533 (2011) 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/ilj/vol12/iss2/9 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego International Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more 
information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 







   
  
   
  
   
    
    







    
  
 
One Time Too Many: In re Briones and 
the BIA’s Rigid Interpretation of the 





I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 534 
II. THE CREATION OF THE LIFE ACT ...................................................................... 535 
III. THE BIA IN BRIONESADDRESSED THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN SECTIONS 245(I) AND 212(A) ............................................................. 537 
IV. HOW THE WIDELY APPLICABLE FACTS OF BRIONES
WILL HAVE DIRE CONSEQUENCES FOR SIMILARLY 
SITUATED UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS................................................................... 539 
V. THE BIA’S DEVASTATING INTERPRETATION OF THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN SECTIONS 245 AND 212 ...................................................................... 542 
VI. THE BIA’S INTERPRETATION IN BRIONES: OPPOSING COURTS 
OF APPEALS’ PRIOR PRECEDENTS AND FORCING 
ADHERENCE TO THE STRICT INTERPRETATION .................................................... 546 
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Life Act Treatment in 
 Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales..................................................................... 546 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Acosta v. Gonzales Shed Additional 
Light on the Conflict Between INA Sections 245(i) 
 and 212(a)................................................................................................ 549 
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of San Diego School of Law.  I would like to
thank Professor Jorge A. Vargas, David Froman of Froman Law Firm, and the current 
editorial board of the San Diego International Law Journal for their support and suggestions
while writing this article.
 533





   
   
  
















     
  
  
   
  
    
C. Subsequent U.S. Court of Appeals Decisions  
Expressing Disdain for Briones and Potential 
Use of the Administrative Procedure Act ................................................. 551 
VII. CONCLUSION: THE BIAMISINTERPRETED THE LIFE
ACT AND CONGRESS MUST AMEND IT TO OVERTURN 
BRIONES............................................................................................................. 554 
I. INTRODUCTION
The constant flow of immigrants into the United States has existed
since before the country’s birth, and the overwhelming majority of U.S. 
citizens are descendants of immigrants.1  For this reason, immigration 
law and policy constantly adapt to the political, economic, and cultural 
flow of American society.2  The governance of U.S. immigration must 
constantly adjust in order to cope with fluctuations in immigration trends 
and to provide navigable means of adjusting immigration status.  In 
recent years, U.S. immigration laws constricted so dramatically that now
the process of altering one’s status is extremely challenging.3  At least to
some degree, these restrictive laws have increased the number of illegal
immigrants in the United States to close to 11.2 million.  In turn, their 
high numbers forced the U.S. Congress to pass additional immigration 
reform in 2000, to better enable some classes of immigrants the opportunity 
to adjust their status.4 
The 2000 immigration reforms held great promise and spurred high
expectations for finally creating an effective means to regularize and 
grant legal status for a good portion of the illegal immigrant population.
Yet before the reform could take full effect, a 2007 decision by the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) tied the hands of all immigration 
courts and U.S. courts of appeals when it decided In re Briones.5 
Briones interpreted one of the most significant 2000 reforms, President
Clinton’s LIFE Act, so narrowly that it effectively nullified a potential 
major change to U.S. immigration law and dashed the hopes of advocates
for sweeping integration of undocumented residents into our society.
1. See Darren H. Weiss, X Misses the Spot: Fernandez v. Keisler and the
(Mis)appropriation of Brand X by the Board of Immigration Appeals, 17 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 889, 890 (2010). 
2. Id.
3. See Sylvia Moreno, Stricter Immigration Law Dominates Smith Resume, WASH.
POST, Mar. 23, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/03/22/AR2007032202042.html. 
4. Hope Yen, Number of Illegal Immigrants in US Steady at 11.2M, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Feb 1, 2011, available at http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/number-illegal-
immigrants-us-steady-112m. 
5. See In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 355 (B.I.A. 2007). 
534
GONZALEZ ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2011 10:12 AM     
 











    

















[VOL. 12:  533, 2011] One Time Too Many 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
This Casenote will discuss both the origins of the LIFE Act and its 
early potential, and then focus attention on the BIA decision itself in
Briones and its impact on immigration courts and U.S. courts of appeals. 
In Part II, this Casenote will give a brief overview of the LIFE Act and
its creation. Parts III and IV will discuss the issues presented in Briones, 
the facts of the case, and the BIA’s decision. In Part V, the Casenote will
then analyze the decision in Briones as it conflicts with previous case 
law from multiple circuit courts of appeal and goes against the 
congressional intent behind the LIFE Act. Additionally, Part VI will
evaluate the negative impact of Briones’ various public policy concerns. 
The Casenote will conclude in part VII by imploring the BIA to reevaluate 
the issues addressed in Briones and urge the U.S. Congress to amend the 
LIFE Act to include a precedent clause stating that § 245(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) trumps INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)’s
definition of inadmissibility. 
II. THE CREATION OF THE LIFE ACT
On December 21, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the Legal 
Immigration and Family Equity Act (LIFE Act), an extension of earlier 
immigration reform passed in 1994.6 Congress drafted the LIFE Act to
provide an exception to the general rule barring illegal aliens from 
obtaining permanent residence, citizenship, or even a temporary visa.7 
Mainly, the rule targets individuals who enter the country without
inspection and are thus ineligible to claim lawful permanent status.8 
Congress designed the LIFE Act to provide adjustment of status
opportunities for a limited number of immigrants who were unable to
regularize their status under previous laws.9 
6. See  MATTHEW J. GIBNEY & RANDALL HANSON, IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM:
FROM 1900 TO THE PRESENT 467–68 (2005).  The earlier reform, passed in 1994, was a 
measure which forgave undocumented immigrants and allowed them the opportunity to
become permanent residents without having to leave the United States. See Section 245(i): 
“Adjustment of Status” Mini-Amnesty, FED’N OFAM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, July 2002, 
available at http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iicimmigrationissuecenters 
326f. 
7. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(a) (West 2011), 8 U.S.C.A.
§1255(a) (West 2011). 
8. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(i). 
9. See 146 Cong. Rec. S11263-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Hatch), See also 146 Cong. Rec. S11850-52 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy). 
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Members of Congress who spoke in support of the LIFE Act emphasized 
that the overriding goal of the bill was to reunify illegal entrants and/or 
status violators who have otherwise “played by the rules” with their
families.10  A second proponent in Congress stated “spouses, children, 
parents and siblings of permanent residents or U.S. citizens . . . [must be 
permitted] to adjust their status in the United States and avoid needless 
separation from their loved ones.”11 The LIFE Act was codified at        
§ 245(i), and went into effect on December 21, 2000.  Section 245(i) 
provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) . . . [A]n alien physically present in the United States— 
(A) who— 
(i) entered the United States without inspection; . . .
. . . ; and
(B) who is the beneficiary . . . of—
(i) a petition for classification . . . that was filed with the Attorney
General on or before April 30, 2001; . . . and
(C) who, in the case of a beneficiary of a petition for classification . . . that
was filed after January 14, 1998, is physically present in the United
States on December 21, 2000; 
may apply to the Attorney General for the adjustment of his or her status to that 
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The Attorney General
may accept such application only if the alien remits with such application a
sum equaling $1,000 as of the date of receipt of the application . . . . 
(2) Upon receipt of such an application and the sum hereby required, the 
Attorney General may adjust the status of the alien to that of an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence if—
(A) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to 
the United States for permanent residence; and
(B) an immigrant visa is immediately available to the alien at the time the
application is filed.12 
Briefly, the statute allows aliens who entered the United States without
inspection to adjust their status to that of a lawful permanent resident,
despite their illegal entry. However, the alien must be otherwise eligible 
for adjustment of status, meaning (1) someone with legal status had filed
a visa petition for the alien on or before April 30, 2001; (2) if the petition 
was filed between January 14, 1998 and April 30, 2001, the alien was 
physically in the United States on the day the law went into effect
(December 21, 2000); and (3) the alien pays $1,000 to the Attorney
General.13
 10. Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing 146
Cong. Rec. S11263-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch)). 
11. Id. at 1242. (citing 146 Cong. Rec. S11850-52 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy)). 
12. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(i) (West 2011), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(i)
(West 2011) (emphasis added). 
13. See id.
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III. THE BIA IN BRIONESADDRESSED THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN SECTIONS 245(I) AND 212 (A) 
In November 2007, in the case of In re Briones, the BIA addressed the 
issue of whether adjustment of status under § 245(i) was available to an
alien who was considered inadmissible to the United States under
§ 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the INA.14  In other words, did the exception in
§ 245(i) actually apply to aliens inadmissible under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)? 
The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) prosecutors in
Briones sought clarification—and likely hoped to exploit a caveat in
§ 245(i)—to whether the exception only granted an eligible alien the 
option to receive a visa if found “admissible.”15  This “admissible” stipulation 
in § 245(i) directly conflicts with the restrictions on admissibility outlined in
§ 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). 
In detail, § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) states that any alien “who has been 
unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more
than 1 year . . . and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States 
without being admitted is inadmissible.” (Emphasis added.)16  Practically 
speaking, § 245(i) grants aliens who have entered the United States 
without inspection the opportunity to adjust their status so long as they 
are otherwise admissible. Paradoxically, § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) makes 
aliens who enter the United States without inspection after accruing a 
previous unlawful presence inadmissible.  In other words, despite their 
best intentions, Congress created a problematic contradiction: it drew an
exception for a category of undocumented aliens to become admissible 
under § 245(i), but under § 212(a) all undocumented aliens, by virtue of 
their unlawful presence in the United States, are inadmissible. 
Furthermore, the language in § 245(i) neglected to state whether it meant 
to override or take precedence over § 212(a), specifically § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I),
in determining whether an individual is eligible to adjust his or her 
status. 
In Briones, the BIA determined that the § 245(i) exception did not
trump the § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) bar on admissibility of undocumented
aliens. Their decision created an adverse legal precedent which the U.S. 
14. See In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 355 (B.I.A. 2007). 
15. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(i)(2)(A), § 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(i)(2)(A) 
(emphasis added). 
16. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212 (a)(9) (emphasis added). 
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courts of appeals are bound to follow.17  This is because the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., held that courts of appeals must give deference to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute, unless the interpretation is “arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.”18  In addition, the Supreme Court
elaborated that courts of appeals must apply Chevron deference to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute regardless of the fact it is contrary to
their existing precedent, provided that the court’s earlier precedent was
an interpretation of a statutory ambiguity.19  Therefore, multiple circuits 
will be forced to overrule previous holdings regarding the LIFE Act
reform, unless they determine that the BIA’s interpretation was arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.20 Briones therefore
binds all U.S. courts of appeals’ interpretations of § 245(i). 
The BIA’s interpretation of Briones will also have detrimental effects
on public policy.  The LIFE Act was designed to keep families together 
and to allow illegal immigrants who have otherwise “played by the
rules” to adjust their status to that of a legal permanent resident.21 The
BIA’s decision in Briones will negatively impact the application of the 
LIFE Act, barring any opportunity to obtain legal status for thousands of
productive members of society who are simply waiting for visas—for 
which their legal relatives helped them to apply for—to become 
“available,” which is necessary so that they can adjust their status.22  The 
decision will inevitably punish children who were brought into the 
United States at a young age, subsequently left, and reentered unlawfully 
again to return to their home and family.  It will also prevent immigrants 
who are already in the United States from obtaining social security
numbers, paying taxes, and registering for driver’s licenses.
17. See Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984); In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 355. 
18. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; Emokah v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 
2008) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 
19. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
980–82 (2005). In this case, the BIA is the governing body of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the U.S. immigration agency, and therefore the courts of appeals must
defer to the BIA’s decisions concerning ambiguous statutes. Board of Immigration
Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (In turn, the
circuit courts of appeals are now bound to adhere to the BIA interpretation of § 245(i) 
because of the decision in Briones) (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
20. The Supreme Court in Chevron made its decision on the belief that agencies 
are better suited to interpret ambiguous statutes based on their in-depth understanding of
specific, intricate statutes.  The Supreme Court reasoned that while circuit court judges 
have general knowledge of the statutes, agencies were more prepared to interpret statutes
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
21. Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2006). 
22. See infra note 25 for more detailed explanation of visa process. 
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Briones’ interpretation of the relationship between §§ 245(i) and
212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) will ultimately preclude an entire class of immigrants 
who have close ties with lawful permanent residents and U.S. citizens 
from ever adjusting their status, forcing them to remain illegal
immigrants as long as they continue to reside in the United States with
their family members.  Section 245(i) specifically aims at helping this
group of aliens by allowing them to adjust their status regardless of their 
undocumented entry.
IV. HOW THE WIDELY APPLICABLE FACTS OF BRIONES WILL HAVE 
DIRE CONSEQUENCES FOR SIMILARLY SITUATED
UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS
The facts presented in Briones are common to many different 
immigration proceedings, and therefore will be extremely relevant in 
future litigation.23  In  Briones, the respondent, Alonzo Briones, was a 
Mexican citizen who entered the United States without inspection in 
1992.24  In March 1993, Briones’ father, then a lawful permanent resident, 
filed a Petition for Alien Relative on his son’s behalf.25  The petition 
23. See Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2006); Padilla-Caldera, 453 F.3d
1237; Mora v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2008); Ramirez-Canales v. Mukasey, 517 
F.3d 904 (6th Cir. 2008); Renteria-Ledesma v. Holder, 615 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2010). 
24. See In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 356 (B.I.A. 2007). 
25. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets the number of immigrant visas
that may be issued to individuals seeking permanent resident status each year. Immigrant 
visas available to “immediate relatives” of U.S. citizens are unlimited, and therefore are
always available.  Immediate relatives include parents of an adult U.S. citizen, spouses 
of a U.S. citizen and, unmarried children under the age of twenty-one of a U.S. citizen.
However, immigrant visa numbers for individuals in a “preference category” are limited, and
are not always available.  Individuals in a preference category include brothers and sisters of a
U.S. citizen, children over the age of twenty-one of a U.S. citizen, married children of a U.S. 
citizen, spouses, children under twenty-one, and unmarried children over twenty-one of a
legal permanent resident. 
The U.S. Department of State is the agency that distributes visa numbers. Family
sponsored preference categories are limited to 226,000 per year, and employment based 
preference visas are limited to 140,000 per year. In addition, there are limits to the 
percentage of visas that can be allotted to each country.  Because the demand is higher
than the supply of visas for a given year for some categories, the categories become 
oversubscribed, and a visa queue (waiting list) forms. To distribute the visas among
all preference categories, the Department of State gives out the visas by providing visa
numbers according to the preference category and one’s priority date. The priority date 
(the date the required petition was filed) is used to determine an individual’s place in line 
in the visa queue.  When the priority date becomes current, the individual will be eligible
to apply for an immigrant visa. See Visa Availability and Priority Dates, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Sep. 29, 2009), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c 
 539







    
   






     
    
 
  
    
  




    
  
  
classified Briones as a family-sponsored immigrant in the second-
preference category—an unmarried son of a lawful permanent resident.26 
The former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (now USCIS) 
approved the petition in January 1994, but no visa number was available 
to Briones at that time because his preference category was oversubscribed.27 
As a result, Briones remained in the United States undocumented, 
waiting for a visa number until December 1998, when he returned to 
Mexico.28 
On March 3, 1999, Briones’ father became a naturalized citizen of the 
United States.29  As a result, Briones’ approved second-preference visa
petition was automatically converted to an approved first-preference 
petition. Because there are more visa numbers available to first-preference 
applicants, Briones’ wait to adjust his status was shortened considerably.30 
After less than three months abroad, on March 18, 1999, Briones
reentered the United States without inspection, and thereafter, resided 
undocumented in the United States.  In July 1999, after a visa number 
was finally available in his preference category, Briones filed an
Application to Adjust Status with the DHS pursuant to the § 245(i) 
admissibility exception of the LIFE Act, on the basis of his previously
approved 1994 Petition for Alien Relative.31 
In 2004, the DHS denied Briones’ adjustment of status application.  In
addition, DHS officials initiated removal proceedings, charging Briones 
with inadmissibility as an alien who reentered the United States without 
2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextchannel=aa290a5659083210VgnVCM100000082c
a60aRCRD&vgnextoid=aa290a5659083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD [hereinafter
Visa Availability]. See also Visa Bulletin for March 2011, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 9, 
2011), http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5337.html. 
26. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (1988); In 
re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 356 (B.I.A. 2007). 
27. As of March 2011, the Department of State is only reviewing petitions filed on
or before July 15, 1992 for Mexican citizens who are the unmarried sons or daughters of 
a permanent resident, those aliens waiting in the second-preference category.  So, an alien 
currently in Briones’ position could expect to wait approximately 19 years, or until 2030, 
for a visa to become available in their category. See VISA BULLETIN FOR MARCH 2011,
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5337.html. 
28. In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 356 (B.I.A. 2007). 
29. Naturalization is the process by which U.S. citizenship is granted to a foreign
citizen or national after he or she fulfills the requirements established by Congress in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. In most cases, an applicant for naturalization must be a
permanent resident (green card holder) before filing.  Except for certain U.S. military
members and their dependents, naturalization can only be granted in the United States. See




30. Id. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(i)(3) (1999). 
31. In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 356. 
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admission after living unlawfully within the United States for over a
year.32  As previously discussed, § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) dictates that
individuals who have reentered the United States without inspection after 
incurring more than one year of unlawful presence are inadmissible for
purposes of adjustment of status and are permanently barred from future 
adjustment.33  Briones denied the charge and attempted to renew his
application for adjustment of status, arguing that inadmissibility under 
§ 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) did not impede the § 245(i) adjustment exception— 
an exception for aliens present in the United States despite earlier 
uninspected entry.34  The immigration judge denied Briones’ application, 
concluding that inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) rendered him,
and others like him, ineligible for adjustment of status.35  Briones 
immediately appealed to the BIA.36 
To better illustrate the potential impact of § 245(i), consider the
following hypothetical, based on a fairly ordinary scenario: an alien
enters the United States with his mother and siblings as an infant; 
completes elementary school, middle school, and high school; and 
creates a life for himself within the United States. Unfortunately, his 
undocumented status makes him ineligible for a social security card, 
therefore ineligible for any financial aid for college or graduate studies,
ineligible to apply for nearly all blue or white collar jobs, and unable to 
register for a driver’s license at the Department of Motor Vehicle.
Fortunately for the alien, someone in his family is either a legal
permanent resident or U.S. citizen and applies on his behalf for a visa. 
Years later, while still awaiting a visa number so that he can adjust his 
status and properly put his U.S. education to use, he receives word that a 
relative, who still resides in his country of citizenship, has passed away. 
The alien must leave the United States to settle the affairs of his 
deceased relative.  A few weeks later he returns to his friends, family, 
and life in the United States, once again entering the country without
inspection. Aside from his undocumented entry, this young man has 
otherwise fully abided by the laws of the United States. Further, his
work ethic and ties within his community have benefited the country. 
32. Id.
33. Id. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212 (a)(9)(C)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (2000). 
34. In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 356. 
35. Id. at 357. 
36. Id.
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He has created jobs, consumed U.S. products, and has consistently paid 
his taxes. However, under the BIA’s decision in Briones, he, along with 
many others, is no longer eligible for the visa, for which he has long
awaited, based on two acts which were largely beyond his control.  Had
he entered the United States without inspection only once, even the
BIA agrees, he would still be eligible for adjustment of status 
under § 245(i).37 
Under this example, the BIA would put this young man, whose only 
legal violation was entering the United States without inspection twice, 
in the same category as aliens who have shown blatant disregard for both 
U.S. laws and the U.S. judicial system, because, after an initial
deportation, they chose to disobey a direct court order and reenter the 
United States. As will be discussed in greater detail later, this is the 
interpretation that the BIA utilized in Briones to hold that inadmissible
aliens under § 212 (a)(9)(C)(i)(I)—aliens inadmissible based on a
reentry—deserve the same treatment as inadmissible aliens under § 212 
(a)(9)(C)(i)(II)—aliens inadmissible based on reentry after a previous
deportation.38 
Essentially, the BIA interprets the statute to mean that aliens who have 
simply entered the United States without inspection on more than one 
occasion deserve the same treatment as aliens who have directly defied a
court order. Additionally, the BIA would allow the young man’s entire 
family to adjust their status under § 245(i), based on the fact that they
only entered without inspection on one occasion, while precluding him 
from adjustment based solely on a second entry after a completely 
voluntary departure. 
V. THE BIA’S DEVASTATING INTERPRETATION OF THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN SECTIONS 245 AND 212
In analyzing Briones, the BIA affirmed the lower court’s decision.
The BIA found that the “respondent [was] inadmissible to the United 
States under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act and that his
inadmissibility under that section [made] him ineligible for adjustment
of status under section 245(i) by precluding him from demonstrating that 
37. See In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 359–60. 
38. Aliens falling under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) may still be eligible for adjustment of
status.  However, they must submit an I-212 application for permission to reapply for
admission.  If this additional petition is approved, it can negate the effect of the previous 
deportation.  Therefore, the combination of an approved I-212 application and the benefits of
the LIFE Act may allow aliens who have reentered the United States after a previous
deportation to adjust their status under § 245(i).  See David Froman, How VAWA Special
Rule Inadmissibility and an I-212 Application Can Overcome Reinstatement of Removal
and the Permanent Bar, BENDER’S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN (forthcoming 2011). 
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he [was] ‘admissible to the United States for permanent residence.’”39 
The courts have further interpreted the decision in Briones to purport that 
“[e]ven though aliens who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) 
may be eligible for adjustment of status under section 245(i) by operation of
section 1182(a)‘s savings clause, aliens who are inadmissible also under
section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) are not.”40  This further interpretation demonstrates
the discriminatory effects that Briones had on a specific class of aliens
that would otherwise have been eligible for the benefits of the LIFE Act. 
The BIA held that § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) precluded aliens who reentered 
the United States illegally and spent more than one year in the United 
States unlawfully, and therefore such aliens could never benefit from the 
§ 245(i) exception.41 
The BIA based its decision in Briones on three main arguments.  First, 
the BIA argued that § 212(a) aimed “to single out recidivist immigration
violators and make it more difficult for them to be admitted to the 
United States after having departed.”42  The BIA came to this conclusion 
by reasoning that because aliens covered by § 212(a)(9)(C) are a subset 
of those covered by § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), Congress must have intended to
target repeat offenders over first-time offenders.43  Based on this
assumption, the BIA concluded that sheer existence of § 212(a), and
other provisions effectively punishing recidivists, “reflects a clear
congressional judgment that . . . repeat offenses are a matter of special
concern and that recidivist immigration violators are more culpable . . .
than first-time offenders.”44  Ironically, however, § 245(i) was structured
to grant relief to a subsection of potential “recidivists” who had 
otherwise followed the rules, yet the BIA ignored this.
Moreover, in 1994, when § 245(i) was originally enacted, immigration
law drew no formal distinction between an alien who had “entered 
without inspection” once and one who had done so repeatedly: both the 
39. In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 371. 
40. See Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2006); Mora
v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing the effects of the holding in
Briones).  The introductory language of § 212(a) notes that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in 
this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible . . . are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to
be admitted to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (West 2011) (emphasis added). This
language acts as a “savings clause,” allowing admission of otherwise inadmissible aliens
where the statute so provides. See id. at § 1182(a). 
41. See Mora, 550 F.3d at 231 (outlining the reasoning used in Briones).
42. In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 358. 
43. See id. at 365–66. 
44. Id. at 371. 
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first-time offender and the recidivist would have been deportable under 
the former § 241(a)(1)(B).45  Furthermore, aliens who had reentered the 
United States after previously accruing more than one year of unlawful
presence were not considered inadmissible, strongly suggesting that it
was not Congress’ intent to preclude such aliens from eligibility
under § 245(i). 
Second, the BIA observed how, prior to the enactment of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 
1996, aliens who reentered the country after previous deportation—and
who fall under the current § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II)—were not eligible for
adjustment of status under § 245(i).46  The BIA concluded that applying
§ 212(a)‘s savings clause to § 212(a)(9)(C) would make adjustment of 
status available to a large class of aliens who never were entitled to it.47 
It came to this conclusion by reasoning that § 212(a)(9)(C) “define[s] a 
unitary ground of inadmissibility that may be predicated on various 
types of conduct,” contending that §§ 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) and (II) should 
not be treated differently for purposes of applying § 245(i).48 
However, when IIRIRA was passed in 1996, it made aliens who
reentered the country after having accrued more than one year of
unlawful presence inadmissible for purposes of becoming a permanent
resident.  Prior to the passage of IIRIRA, such aliens were not 
inadmissible.49  Moreover, when the LIFE Act was originally passed in 
1994, aliens who had reentered the country after having accrued more
than one year of unlawful presence were admissible for adjustment of
status.50  So, in making the argument that §§ 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) and (II)
should be treated equally for purposes of § 245(i), the BIA went against 
the original application of the statute at the time of its creation in 1994, 
45. Id. at 363. 
46. See id. at 366–69. 
47. Id. at 366–67. 
48. In discussing a “unitary ground,” the BIA was referring to the fact that under § 
212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), aliens who reenter the United States after accruing more than one year 
of unlawful presence are inadmissible whereas, under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II), aliens 
who reenter the United States after being deported are inadmissible. The court reasoned that
because these two classes of aliens are grouped under the same section, they must
be treated the same for purposes of § 245(i).  In a previous case, In re Torres-Garcia, the BIA
held that aliens who reentered the United States after a previous deportation were ineligible 
for adjustment of status under § 245(i). The BIA in Briones reasoned that because the 
two classes of aliens are located near each other in the INA, the same treatment should
be given to aliens who simply reentered after remaining in the United States undocumented 
for more than one year.  See id. at 358–59 & 365–67 (discussing In re Torres-Garcia, 23
I. & N. Dec. 866, 868 (B.I.A. 2006)).
49. See In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 362–63. 
50. See id. at 366–69. See also GIBNEY & HANSON, supra note 6, at 467. 
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ultimately excluding a large class of aliens who were always entitled to
§ 245(i) benefits. 
Third, the BIA reasoned “where Congress has extended eligibility for
adjustment of status to inadmissible aliens (in other words, where
Congress has ‘otherwise provide[d]’ within the meaning of the savings 
clause)” it has generally done so “unambiguously, either by negating
certain grounds of inadmissibility outright or by providing for discretionary
waivers of inadmissibility, or both.”51  For illustrative purposes, the BIA 
described a statute enacted in 1998, granting a special adjustment of 
status option to certain Cuban, Central American, and Haitian aliens who 
were unlawfully present in the United States but, with certain specified 
exceptions, were otherwise admissible.52  When Congress realized that 
many of the aliens eligible for this special relief might be barred from 
adjusting their status because of the restrictions of the 1996 IIRIRA, 
Congress passed amendments that explicitly gave the U.S. Attorney
General discretion to waive § 212(a)(9)(C) as a ground for inadmissibility
with regard to those aliens.53 
The BIA concluded that this special relief and subsequent amendment 
“demonstrates that when Congress wants to make adjustment of status
available to aliens despite their inadmissibility under section [212(a)(9)(C)],
it knows how to do so.”54  Thus, the BIA determined that because 
Congress did not clearly outline an exception to the admissibility
requirement for those aliens who reentered the United States under     
§ 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), it did not intend for those aliens to benefit from 
§ 245(i). Unfortunately, the BIA’s reasoning is flawed because, until its 
decision in Briones, Congress had no necessity to amend § 245(i). Prior
to the decision in Briones, multiple U.S. courts of appeals held that
aliens who were inadmissible under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) could still 
51. In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 367 (alteration in original).
52. Mora v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing In re Briones, 24 I.
& N. Dec. at 367; Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-
277, tit. IX, § 902(a), 112 Stat. 2681-538, 2681-538 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 
note); Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub L. No. 105-100, tit.
II, § 202(a), 111 Stat. 2193, 2193–94 (1997) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255
note)).
53. Id. (citing In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 368; LIFE Act Amendments of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, div. B, tit. XV, § 1505(a), (b), 114 Stat. 2763A-324, 2763A-
326 to -327 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 note)).
54. In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 368. 
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receive the benefits of § 245(i).55  Therefore, Congress had no reason to 
believe that the courts were having difficulty interpreting the conflicting 
statutes and that an amendment was necessary to clarify the issue. 
Based on this reasoning, the BIA concluded inadmissibility under INA 
§ 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) precludes aliens from adjusting their status under 
§ 245(i). Furthermore, the BIA held that § 212(a)’s savings clause does 
not apply to aliens who are inadmissible also under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).56 
VI. THE BIA’S INTERPRETATION IN BRIONES: OPPOSING COURTS OF
APPEALS’ PRIOR PRECEDENTS AND FORCING ADHERENCE
TO THE STRICT INTERPRETATION
Prior to the decision in Briones, multiple U.S courts of appeals 
analyzed and decided whether INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) precludes aliens 
from adjusting their status under § 245(i).57 When compared to the three
rationales of the BIA in Briones, these decisions contain more persuasive,
but alas, non-binding reasoning. The following sample cases, while no 
longer good law, do illustrate why the BIA decided Briones incorrectly
and why Congress should amend § 245(i)—unless, of course, the BIA 
realizes its error and overturn its decision in Briones.  Prior to the 
decision in Briones, both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
and Tenth Circuit held that § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) does not preclude aliens 
from adjusting their status under § 245(i). 
A. The Tenth Circuit’s LIFE Act Treatment in 
Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales
In 2005, the Tenth Circuit held in Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales that an
alien’s permanent inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) did not 
defeat his eligibility for penalty-fee adjustment of status under § 245(i).58 
In making its determination, the court made five primary arguments 
supporting its determination.
First, the Tenth Circuit noted that the LIFE Act was created to provide 
an exception to the general rule that aliens who entered the country
without inspection are ineligible to seek adjustment to lawful permanent
55. See Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550, 550 (9th Cir. 2006); Padilla-Caldera v.
Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1237 (10th Cir. 2006). 
56. Acosta, 439 F.3d 550; Padilla-Caldera, 453 F.3d 1237. 
57. See Mortera-Cruz v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 246, 254–56 (5th Cir. 2005); Acosta,
439 F.3d 550; Padilla-Caldera, 453 F.3d 1237. 
58. Padilla-Caldera, 453 F.3d at 1239.  The Tenth Circuit subsequently overturned its
decision in March 2011, as a direct result of the BIA’s decision in Briones. See discussion
infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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status.59  The Tenth Circuit reasoned that while the government relied on
§ 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), a permanent bar provision, to prevent the respondent 
from obtaining relief under the LIFE Act, § 212(a)’s “savings clause” 
preceded the “inadmissible” language and specifically states that certain
classes of aliens—such as the recidivist undocumented entrant, in this 
case—are inadmissible “except as otherwise provided in this chapter.”60 
The Tenth Circuit articulated that because of § 212(a)’s savings clause,
aliens otherwise inadmissible under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) were eligible for 
the benefits of § 245(i).  In other words, rather than conducting a strange 
and convoluted dissection of the INA subsections of § 212 as the BIA 
did, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the power of the § 212(a)’s savings 
clause, which applied to every nuance of § 212(a). 
Second, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that because Congress enacted the 
LIFE Act after it enacted § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), the LIFE Act should 
trump § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).  The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that
“[c]onflicting statutes should be interpreted so as to give effect to each
but to allow a later enacted, more specific statute to amend an earlier, 
more general statute . . . “61 The Tenth Circuit confirmed that the LIFE Act 
was signed into law in 2000, which followed the passage of § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) 
by over three years.62  The Tenth Circuit inferred that the intent of
Congress when enacting the LIFE Act in 2000 was to allow a specific 
class of otherwise law-abiding immigrants an opportunity to adjust
status to that of a lawful permanent residence.  Contrary to the BIA’s
flimsy inference of Congressional intent by reference to the 1998 special
adjustment statute, the Tenth Circuit grounded its decision on the widely
accepted rule that the most recently passed legislation trumps earlier,
outdated legislation and looked directly at the legislative history of the 
LIFE Act itself. 
Third, the Padilla-Caldera opinion specifically included statements
made by members of Congress who spoke in support of the LIFE Act.
The Tenth Circuit noted that members of Congress emphasized that the 
overriding goal of the LIFE Act was family reunification for illegal
59. Padilla-Caldera, 453 F.3d at 1241. 
60. Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 
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entrants and status violators who have otherwise “played by the rules.”63 
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that legislators desired to use
the LIFE Act to allow “spouses, children, parents and siblings of permanent 
residents or U.S. citizens . . . to adjust their status in the United States
and avoid needless separation from their loved ones.”64  The Tenth 
Circuit bolstered this Congressional intent finding by highlighting one
section of the Act which specifically gives the U.S. Attorney General
authority to waive non-criminal grounds of inadmissibility “to assure
family unity.”65 Both of the statements serve to show the intent of 
Congress to unify families, not to punish otherwise well-behaved aliens,
further demonstrating the major error the BIA made in Briones and its 
failure to discern Congressional intent regarding the LIFE Act. 
Like the BIA attempted in Briones, the Tenth Circuit’s rationale in 
Padilla-Caldera also separated § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) from § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). 
Here, however, the Tenth Circuit argued that while those aliens falling
into subsection (II)—aliens who have reentered after a previous 
deportation or removal—are not eligible for adjustment of status under 
§ 245(i), those aliens under subsection (I)—aliens who have reentered
after accruing more than one year of unlawful presence—are.66  The  
Tenth Circuit recognized that the class of aliens who violate          
§ 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) are not the type of illegal entrants meant to be
covered by § 245(i) , those illegal entrants who otherwise “played by the
rules.”67  Instead, those aliens falling under subsection (II) are illegal 
entrants who violate direct court orders. In contrast, the class of aliens
covered by § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) fit within the intended scope of § 245(i).
Unknowingly, the Tenth Circuit directly opposed the future BIA 
decision in determining that just because two provisions are placed near
each other in the federal code does not mean they are identical: physical 
proximity of the statutory provisions alone cannot override the intent of 
Congress to apply § 245(i) to only one of these two classes of aliens.68 
Finally, the Padilla-Caldera opinion examined other recent immigration 
reform acts, using those provisions as evidence of Congressional intent
of the application of § 245(i).69 The Tenth Circuit noted that another
clause in the LIFE Act of 2000 “specifically exempted certain Central 
63. Id. at 1242 (citing 146 Cong. Rec. S11263-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2000) (statement
of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added)). 
64. Id. (citing 146 Cong. Rec. S11850-52 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy)). 
65. Id. (referencing § 1255(h)(2)(B)). 





GONZALEZ ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2011 10:12 AM     
 


















   







   
  
[VOL. 12:  533, 2011] One Time Too Many 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
American aliens applying for adjustment of status from the strictures of
§ 243(a)(5).”70  The Tenth Circuit further noted that the House Report
accompanying the 2000 amendments clarified that the “intended effect
was to permit ‘Nicaraguan [sic], Cubans, and Haitians eligible for 
adjustment of status . . . [to] receive this relief despite having been
previously removed under an order of removal . . . ’”71  Neither the resulting 
amendment nor the House Report discussed the effect of the LIFE Act
on those aliens who have been unlawfully present in the United States
for an aggregate period of more than one year and who entered or 
attempted to reenter the United States without being admitted.72 Thus,
the Tenth Circuit concluded the authors of the LIFE Act did not think an 
exemption was necessary for part of this other class of aliens—those 
who are deemed inadmissible under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)—presumably 
because § 245(i) was intended to apply to all aliens deemed inadmissible
under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).73  Therefore, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that
Congress did not need to enact an additional exception for aliens already 
eligible for adjustment of status under § 245(i).
Based on those primary arguments, the Tenth Circuit in Padilla-
Caldera determined that aliens who are inadmissible under § 212(a)(9) 
(C)(i)(I) are nevertheless still eligible to adjust their status under § 245(i).  
Unfortunately, despite its strong reasoning and careful analysis, the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision predated the BIA’s decision in Briones which 
neglected to rely upon the Padilla-Caldera opinion.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Acosta v. Gonzales Shed Additional Light on the 
Conflict between INA Sections 245(i) and 212(a)
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit decided Acosta v. Gonzales which agreed 
with the reasoning set forth by the Tenth Circuit in Padilla-Caldera v.
Gonzales.74  The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he statutory terms of 
§ 245(i) clearly extend adjustment of status to aliens living in this 
country without legal status.”75  The Ninth Circuit based this broad
70. Id. at 1243 (citing Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390 F.3d 1158, 1164 (10th Cir.
2004)). 
71. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 106-1048, at 231 (2001)). 
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550, 558 (9th Cir. 2006) (referencing the correctness
of the Padilla-Caldera decision). 
75. Id. (citing Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783, 793 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
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interpretation on its recognition that the statute’s purpose was to allow
relatives of permanent residents to avoid separation from their loved 
76ones.
The Ninth Circuit also relied on a previous decision relevant to the 
§ 245(i) analysis.  In Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit declared,
“[n]othing in the statutory provisions regarding adjustment of status, nor 
in the discussion of its purposes, suggests that aliens who have been
previously deported or removed are barred from this form of relief.”  It
further determined that “the most natural reading of . . . 245(i) permits 
illegal aliens . . . who can demonstrate the requisite family ties and pay 
the requisite fee, to apply for adjustment of status.”77  The court in 
Acosta, building on the reasoning set forth in Perez-Gonzalez, 
determined that nothing in the statute suggested that aliens who reenter
the country after accruing more than one year of unlawful presence are 
ineligible for penalty-fee adjustment of status.78 
In addition to its reliance on Perez-Gonzalez, the court in Acosta made 
four additional arguments.  First, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “in the 
immigration context . . . we must resolve doubts in favor of the alien.”79 
So, where there is a statutory ambiguity the court should interpret the 
ambiguity in the alien’s favor.  Second, like the Tenth Circuit before it, 
the Ninth Circuit noted the presence of and preemptive power implicit
within the savings clause in § 212(a).80 As a result, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that the government bore the burden of proving that adjustment
of status under § 245(i) did not provide an exception for inadmissibility 
on these grounds.81  Unlike the BIA, after considering the history and 
purpose of the statutory provisions, the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
government’s interpretation of § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).82  Third, the Ninth 
Circuit pointed out that Congress extended eligibility for adjustment
under § 245(i) three years after adding the inadmissibility provision in 
question, emphasizing that a familiar canon of statutory construction 
requires that “conflicting statutes should be interpreted so as to give 
effect to each but to allow a later enacted, more specific statute to amend
an earlier, more general statute.”83  Based on the additional reasoning set 
76. Id. (citing Perez-Gonzalez, 379 F.3d at 793 (citing Joint Memorandum,
Statement of Senator Kennedy, 146 Cong. Rec. S11850-52 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000))). 
77. Perez-Gonzalez, 379 F.3d at 793–94. 
78. Acosta, 439 F.3d at 554. 
79. Akhtar v. Burzynski, 384 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). 




83. Id. at 555 (citing Padilla-Caldera, 426 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 
468 U.S. 992, 1024 (1984)).
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forth—that the court must resolve doubts in favor of the alien, the 
burden of proof is placed on the government, and conflicting statutes
must be interpreted to give effect to a later enacted statute—the Ninth 
Circuit determined that inadmissible aliens under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) 
were still eligible for the benefits of the LIFE Act. 
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits in Padilla-Caldera and Acosta both
gave strong, well-reasoned interpretations of the interplay between §§
245(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). Both of these analyses predated the BIA’s 
decision in Briones and provided persuasive guidance that, for whatever 
misguided reason, the BIA chose to ignore. Unfortunately, the BIA’s 
decision to deviate from these previous holdings will have a detrimental
effect on future decisions.  All U.S. courts of appeals will be forced to 
follow the decision in Briones, overturning previous decisions to the 
contrary, unless they can find that the BIA’s decision was “arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”84 
C. Subsequent U.S. Court of Appeals Decisions Expressing          
Disdain for Briones and Potential Use of the       
Administrative Procedure Act 
Under Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., the U.S. courts of appeals must give deference to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute, unless the interpretation is contrary to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).85  Subsequent to Chevron, in 
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 
the Supreme Court further held that courts of appeals must apply
Chevron deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute regardless of
the circuit’s  contrary precedent, provided that the court’s earlier
precedent was an interpretation of a statutory ambiguity.86  Because of 
the deference that courts of appeals must give to BIA decisions, multiple
circuits are forced to overrule previous precedents on this issue unless
they can show that the BIA’s interpretation was arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.87 
84. See Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984).
85. See id.; Emokah v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Chevron,
467 U.S. at 844).
86. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
980–82 (2005).
87. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
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Since Briones was decided in 2007, multiple courts of appeals
addressing the issue for the first time have been forced to follow the 
BIA’s decision, unable to find that it was arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.88  In 2008, the Second Circuit, in Mora v. Mukasey, 
held that an alien who was inadmissible under § 212 (a)(9)(C)(i)(I) was 
not eligible for adjustment of status under § 245(i), stating, “because we 
conclude that the Briones decision interpreted ambiguous provisions of 
the immigration laws in a reasonable way, we must defer to it pursuant 
to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. . . .
and therefore deny the petition.”89  The decision in Mora shines a bright 
light on the restrictive effects that the Briones decision has had, and will 
continue to have, on the U.S. courts of appeals. 
In 2008, the Sixth Circuit, in Ramirez-Canales v. Mukasey, held that it 
had to give deference to Briones and find the alien inadmissible under
§ 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), therefore ineligible for relief under § 245(i).90 
However, the court remanded to the BIA to grant the alien’s petition 
retroactively, at a point in time prior to his undocumented reentry to the 
United States.91  The Sixth Circuit made this request so that the alien 
would not technically be considered inadmissible under § 212(a)(9)
(C)(i)(I), and would thus be eligible to adjust his status under § 245(i).92 
88. See Mora v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 231, 231 (2d Cir. 2008); Ramirez-Canales v. 
Mukasey, 517 F.3d 904, 908 (6th Cir. 2008); Ramirez v. Holder, No. 09-1629, 1010 WL 
2499988 (4th Cir. 2010); Renteria-Ledesma v. Holder, 615 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2010). Most
recently, in March 2010, the Tenth Circuit was forced to overturn its decision in Padilla-
Caldera v. Gonzales, when it reviewed the case for a second time.  See Padilla-Caldera
v. Holder, No. 10-9520, 2011 WL 856272 (10th Cir. Mar. 14, 2011), as corrected (Mar.
22, 2011). As discussed above, on the original petition for review, the Tenth Circuit held 
that the BIA erred in concluding that petitioner was statutorily ineligible for an adjustment of
status, and it remanded for further proceedings.  Id. at *2. On remand, the immigration
judge granted petitioner an adjustment of status, but the BIA reversed, relying on the 
intervening Briones opinion. Id.  When the case was brought before the Tenth Circuit for
a second time, the court concluded that the intervening Briones opinion was entitled to 
Chevron deference and thus was forced to overturn its previous decision. Id. However,
the Tenth Circuit failed to give an in-depth analysis regarding the reasoning behind 
Briones, and simply chose to quote the BIA’s analysis as evidence that it was reasonable.
Id. at *13–25. After repeating the BIA’s reasoning, the Tenth Circuit stated only that it 
could not say that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute in Briones was unreasonable. Id.
at *25. However, the Tenth Circuit implied that it may have reached a different result if
allowed to interpret the law de novo, stating that “the court ‘may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.’” Id. at *14 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 & n.11).  The 
court then explained that although it had adopted a different line of reasoning in Padilla-
Caldera, it could not find the BIA’s interpretation of the statute in Briones unreasonable. 
Id. at *25. 
89. Mora, 5505 F.3d at 231. 
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In remanding the case for further review and requesting that the BIA
retroactively grant the alien’s petition, the court attempted to offset the 
harsh effects of Briones and allow the alien the opportunity to adjust his 
status under § 245(i).  This indicates that, like the Second Circuit in
Mora, the Sixth Circuit was unable to find the Briones interpretation 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute, but nonetheless 
disagreed with it and attempted to find a way to avoid the harsh
consequences of the decision. 
In April 2011, the Ninth Circuit was forced to overrule its decision in 
Acosta v. Gonzales.93  While the Ninth Circuit seemed sympathetic to 
the alien’s situation, it was unable to find that the decision in Briones
was arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.94 The
Ninth Circuit determined that because Acosta did not “unambiguously
foreclose” the BIA’s authority to interpret the interplay between §
1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (the codified § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)) and § 1255(i) (the 
codified § 245(i)), the BIA remained “the authoritative interpreter 
(within the limits of reason)” of the immigration laws.95  As a result, the
court determined that the BIA’s decision in Briones addressed a
statutory ambiguity and was entitled to Chevron deference.96  The Ninth
Circuit then looked to the other courts of appeals decisions, observing
that none had concluded that Briones was an unreasonable interpretation
of §§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) and 1255(i).97  It then briefly discussed the 
reasoning outlined in Briones and determined that it agreed with the 
other courts of appeals.98 Unfortunately for the undocumented aliens 
targeted by § 245(i), it appears the U.S. courts of appeals have been
unable to find the Briones decision arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute, even to the extent of overruling their own
decisions.
93. See discussion supra Part VI.B.
94. Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, No. 09-72603, 2011 WL 1346960, at *1–2 (9th Cir.
Apr. 11, 2011).
95. Id. at 5 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
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VII. CONCLUSION: THE BIAMISINTERPRETED THE LIFE ACT AND 
CONGRESS MUST AMEND IT TO OVERTURN BRIONES
The BIA’s decision in Briones incorrectly interprets the relationship 
between §§ 245(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), and therefore the decision
must be overturned.  Thus the BIA should repeal its decision in Briones.
If the BIA fails to act, then either Congress should amend the LIFE Act,
or the U.S. courts of appeals should rule that the Briones decision is
arbitrary.  For the following reasons, the Briones decision should not
stand as good law. 
The Briones decision is contrary to congressional intent illustrated in 
the LIFE Act, and is extremely detrimental to the future of many
undocumented aliens.  As stated by Senator Hatch and Senator Kennedy,
the goal of the LIFE Act was family reunification for illegal entrants and 
status violators who have otherwise “played by the rules,” and to allow 
“spouses, children, parents and siblings of permanent residents or U.S. 
citizens . . . to adjust their status in the United States and avoid needless
separation from their loved ones.”99  Furthermore, § 245(i) is only 
available to aliens who submitted petitions prior to May 1, 2001, which
eliminates the risk that allowing inadmissible aliens under § 212(a)(9) 
(C)(i)(I) relief under § 245(i) will open the floodgates of adjusting 
statuses for all undocumented aliens as opponents may irrationally fear. 
The more appropriate interpretation of the statutes is provided in
Padilla-Caldera (Tenth Circuit) and Acosta (Ninth Circuit)—that aliens
inadmissible under § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) are still eligible to adjust their 
status under § 245(i)—which should serve as references when overtuning 
Briones.
The BIA should therefore reevaluate its decision in Briones, 
considering the analysis found in Padilla-Caldera and Acosta, as well as
the serious consequences the decision has on courts, immigrants who 
play by the rules, their families, and their communities.  Alternatively,
Congress should enact more legislation or amend the LIFE Act, as it did
in 1998, clarifying § 245(i) intent.  Additionally, the U.S. courts of 
appeals should carefully scrutinize the analysis in Briones and find that 
it was made arbitrarily.  As it stands, Briones will have extremely
adverse consequences for immigrants in the United States and their 
families, and to prevent such harsh consequences and allow immigrants 
to receive the benefits granted them through the LIFE Act, swift action
99. Id. (citing 146 Cong. Rec. S11850-52 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy)); id. at 1241; Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 
2006) (citing 146 Cong. Rec. S11263-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch)). 
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must be taken by the BIA, Congress, or the U.S. courts of appeals to
overturn Briones. 
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